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I. Introduction 
Like development "from above" (Hansen 1978), the paradigm of develop-
m e n t "f r o m b e 1 o w " i s n o t - a s m i g h t b e a s s u m e d - s i m p 1 y r e 1 at e d t o 
the level at which decisions on development are taken. A change in 
the levels of decision-making is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
(and possibly not even the most important] condition for strategies 
of development"from below" as they are considered here. Such a stra-
tegy involves important changes in the criteria for factor allocation 
(away from the presently dominating principle of maximizing return 
to selected factors), in the criteria for commodity exchange (away 
from the presently dominating principle of comparative advantage), 
changes in social and economic organization (emphasizing territorial 
x) Draft for a paper to be published in Development from Above or Below? A Radical 
Reappraisal of Spatial Planning in Developing Countries, Eds. Stohr W,and O.R.F. 
Taylor. Wiley Publishers (forthcoming). 
I am grateful for comments on an earlier version of this paper to the collaborators 
at my Institute as well as to Leonhard Bauer and tu C.R.F.Taylor. All remaining 
short-comings are of course my own responsibilicy. = am grateful tu Hild 
i(aufmarrn for ir:::ntly tyr-iing mid re-typing the n:oxt from ofter1 territJly 11r,cir:''/ 
manusc ,, o. 
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besides functional organizations) and a change in the basic concept 
of development (away from the present monolithic concept of develop-
ment by economic criteria, competetive behaviour, external motiva-
tion and large-scale redistributive mechanisms). 
Development would need to be considered again as an integral process 
of widening the opportunities of individuals, of social groups and 
territorially organized communities at small and intermediate scales 
,; 
to mobilize the full range of their capabilities and resources for 
their common benefit in social, economic and political terms. This 
means a clear departure from the primarily economic concept of 
development of the 1950's and 60's and from the ensuing pressure upon 
individuals, social groups and territorially organized communities 
to develop only a very narrow segment of their capabilities and 
resources determined by the world system ( "from above"; neglecting 
the remaining ones in order to be able to retain their economic and 
social position vis-a-vis the rest of society. 
Different from development "from above" which was nurtured by economic 
theory of the past three decades (particularly by the neo-classical one) 
there seems to be no well structured theory available as yet for 
an alternative paradigm of development "from below". Partial efforts 
in this direction have been undertaken: at the international level 
by the search for a New International Economic Order (Tinbergen et al., 
1976) or for Another Development (Nerfin, 1977); at the sub-national 
level by such concepts as Agropolitan Development (Friedmann-Douglass, 
1975), Ecodevelopment (Sachs, 1976) and the search for a Theory of 
Rural Development (Haque et al., 1977). But there still is a pressing 
need for a coherent and systematic framework for a~ alternative 
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approach to development. One of the reasons for the lack of such 
a coherent framework may be that it would need to be supported 
by a variety of disciplines and not primarily by economics (as 
our present theory) and that the cumulative cooperation between 
different disciplines apparently is very difficult to achieve. 
Another reason is that there may not be one single strategy of develop-
ment "from below"-as was purported for the more or less monolithic 
industrialization-urbanization strategy "from above" so far - but 
that beyond some basic common features different cultural areas 
will need to construct their own development strategies which only 
at certain contact points between each other will have to be compatible. 
Alternatively, the contact points may need to be restricted to those 
types of interaction where compatibility is feasible and desired by 
each of them. Such alternative strategies of development "from below" 
need to emerge from and be adapted to the requirements of different 
culture areas. They may als~ in alternating sequence, need to take 
turns with phases of development "from above". 
In search for such [an) alternative framework(s) let us start from 
the traditional development pradigm "from above" which, as Hansen 
(197B) has shown, can at the same time be considered as a centre-
down and outward paradigm. 
The past three decades, during whic/-; development strategies "from 
above" dominated, have not led to a decrease of disparities in 
living levels, in many instances even to an increase. This applies 
both to disparities between social strata [Adelman and Morris 1973) 
as well as to spatial disparities (St6hr and T6dtling l977 b]. T~e 
purpose of the present book is to analyse to what extent strategies 
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of development "from above" and "from below'' have been applied in 
different countries and in different socio-political systems, and 
what their effects on the poorest population strata and on the 
poorest regions have been in individual countries. 
Both paradigms, the one of development ''from above• (or centre-down 
and outward) and the one ''from below" (or bottom-up and periphery-
inward) are conceptual constructs which in practice hardly ever occur 
in pure form. Real situations will, particularly in today's highly 
interactive national, continental and world-wide systems, always 
consist of a mix of both these elements. In different national or 
regional situations there is indubitably considerable variation in 
the mak~p of these two elements which extends also to the temporal 
sequence involved. 
Let me now contrast the two concepts with each other in more or less 
pure form. 
II. A Reappraisal of the Centre-Down Paradigm 
As Hansen (1978) has shown, the concept of development"from above" 
assumes that development (whether spontaneous or induced) starts 
only in a relatively few dynamic sectors and geographic clusters 
from where it will (or hopefully should) spread to the remaining 
sectors and geographical areas. This "trickle-down" process is 
essentially supposed to start at the world level [from world-wide 
demand, or world innovation centres) and then filter down and outward 
to national or regional units, either through the urban hierarchy 
[Berry, 197C), through input-output relations (Perroux, 1955) or 
through internal channels of multi-plant business organizations 
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(Lasu~n. 1973; Pred, 1977] or of large-scale governmental organi-
zations. 
Its emphasis therefore has been on urban and industrial, capital 
intensive development, on highest available technology, and on 
maximum use of external and scale economies. As a natural corollary 
it manifests itself in large investment projects, in increasing units 
of functional and territorial integration, in increasing scales 
of (private and public) organizations expected to transmit develop-
ment through these integrated units, and in the reduction of economic, 
social, cultural, political and institutional "barriers" within 
these units (including distance friction. institutional differentia-
tion etc.) which might hinder these expected transmission effects. 
The hypotheses upon which the paradigm of development "from above" 
is - explicitly or implicitly - based are: (1) that development in 
its economic, social, cultural and political dimensions can be 
generated only by some very few select agents (Schumpeter's entre-
preneurial pioneer, 1934); (2) that, over a reasonable span of time, 
these few agents are able and willing to let the remaining agents 
and localities participate in this development on a reasonably 
equal basis; (3) that the remaining agents and localities are able 
and willing to adopt the same type of development; (4) that the 
specific type of (economic, social, cultural and political) develop-
ment initiated by the few select agents is the most suitable one 
for all the other members of the increasingly interactive system 
and that it should therefore replace other existing notions of 
development; ( C I ~) that the (social!y and culturally) n w and the 
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(economically and politically) more powerful notions of development 
are also the "better" ones and therefore the ones which the rest 
of society strives for. Essentially it therefore presumes an even-
tually monolithic and uniform concept of development, of value 
systems and of human happiness. 
In economic terms this is related to the initial Schumpet 8 rian [1934) 
concept of the entrepreneurial pioneer and innovator who knows 
best how to allocate capital and combine production factors in 
leading sectors which then assume a role of dominance (Perroux's 
'industrie motrice') and are able to move the entire economy. 
In social terms it is related to the belief that social transforma-
tion can be guided only by c l ,J s s e s or co u r1 t r i r 0. 
In religious terms it is related to the conviction that only one 
creed is the true one and that by missionary activities of a power-
ful church organisation the rest of humanity should be converted to 
it. 
In cultural terms it is related to the monocentric theories of 
cultural phenomena which have been dominant until recently, 
maintaining e.g. historically fur ~ur • pe that important cultural 
features on the periphery of Europe could be traced back ultimately 
to a single region of origin, namely the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Orient (Childs, 1957; Montelius, 1899)~] or for the whole vrnrld 
in more recent times, that the entire "developing" world is in the 
process of accepting the basic cultural values of the highly 
industrialized "developed" countries. 
x) Only more recently, research backed by radio-carbon and other modern dating 
methods have backed the antitheses that, instead "of a singly seminal centre of 
diffusion ... we can detect indications of innovation in several different areas." 
(Renfrew, 1973, 1975]. Renfrew shows this in analyses of the stone-built 
megalithic monuments of North-Western Europe which originally were traced back to 
Eastern Mediterranean influence, until modern dating techn s proved that they 
viere actually older than the latter, and thf.orefure evidently h,3d r::rr.erged incJr3pm',-
Jently from them. 
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In political terms the concept of development "from above" is 
related to the notion that one or two ideological constructs 
(one monolithic capitalist, and a monolithic communist ideology] 
are the only viable ones and should therefore be introduced to (or 
imposed upon) the rest of the world or of the respective hemispheres. 
Evidently most of such notions are related very closely to the 
interests of the large-scale (private or government) organizations 
which, as mentioned above, were installed to serve as the motor 
of development, but which in many cases have come to dominate the 
system, very often overruling the interests of those - e.g. local and 
regional communities - they were meant to serve. This has therefore 
in most cases led to a high concentration of power in private or 
state run organizations which dominate the greater part of the 
world system. 
Development "from above" consequently concentrates on the sectors 
and forms of development which these large (private or public] 
institutions are able to manage. Therefore it is large project 
oriented, capital intensive, uses high technology, and shows 
other of the characteristics mentioned above. At the same time it 
ignores or overrules (1) the great diversity of value systems and 
aspirations related to differences between historically grown and 
territorially defined cultural systems; (2) the great variations in 
natural conditions which in part have caused the latter; (3) the 
fact that with differentiated aspirations and cultural and natural 
preconditions, the imposition of a uniform concept and measurement 
of development is bound to relegate the groups further away from 
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t;hese standards to what is today called "underdevelopment" and 
still further into a disadvantaged role for measuring up to the 
standards defined by the dominant culture or group as has been 
shown in another context (Stohr-Ti::idtling, 1977 b;; (4; that this 
fact subsequently leads to different dimensions of "dependence" as 
has also be n shown in the latter paper. Once such economically 
disadvantaged groups have started to interact more intensively with 
the "more developed" ones on terms defined by the latter, they are 
increasingly forced to adopt their social, cultural, political and 
institutional norms in an effort to compete with them in economic 
terms, the medium through which most large-scale interactions take 
place; (5) this entails the subordination of broader societal values 
to economic d~erminants, a characteristic which applies to most 
highly developed countries today. 
The alternative would be for economically "less developed" sociul 
groups and areas to give clear priority to their self-determined 
societal standards and to subordinate external economic and other 
interactions to these standards. This is in fuct increasingly 
being demanded by developing countries by terms such as collective 
self-reliance or by considering increased nationalism as an important 
comp on en t of t he f,J e w f'1 ea n in g of Dev e 1 op men t [ Seer s
1 
1 9 7 7 l . x J 
In section IV of this paper we shall show that the supra- or sub-
ordination of purely economizing rational objectives over respectively 
under broader societal norms has changed many times in different 
phases of history and was usually accopmanied by changes in the 
xl [Jud::. 2~rs sugg sts " ..... the explicit endorsement of nationalism, including 
our own - w/-1ici-1 CE,a,,es to be an 'obst,jcle' to development, arid becomes ir:stead 
part of the very essence of it. He feels that whereas the rationally conceived 
"redistribution with growth" is usually resisted by the wsalthy and ul 
national elite ~ programme (of self-re:iant development] may appeal to what seems 
in many countries to be a stronger force than social conscience - nationalism 
being conceived emotionally" (Seers, 1977]. 
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dominant scales of societal interaction and of other elements of 
what we here call development "from above" and "from below". 
Let us now look at the eco11omic aspects of development "from above" 
in more detail, following up on Niles rlansen's (1978) analysis: 
Development "from above" essentially relies on large-scale aggregate 
world-wide demand [at scales ''above" the respective regional or 
national level) for the development of individual communities. 
Usually there exist alternative sources of supply for the satisfaction 
of this aggregate [world-wide] demand. These sources will change 
according to optimal locations where in view of given demand patterns 
factor returns can be maximized at specific points in time and space. 
Selective factor combinations according to such efficiency criteria 
consider costs internal to the specific enterprise or sector only while 
external costs such as idle, under or overemployed factors, en-
vironmental deterioration, etc. are left for the respective terri-
torial (local, regional.and national] unit to cope with. 
In this way natural resources, capital, labour.and organisational 
talent are drawn into a few dynamic locations or regions, the so-
called "spontaneous" growth centres. They become producers of goods 
with high productivity increases and high demand elasticity and 
experience large increases in production and income. These increases, 
however.occur mainly within the economic sectors and social strata 
having access to large scale factor and commodity markets (Hansen, 1976], 
i.e. principally the highly organised formal sector and the high-
income groups. Usually this creates internal disparities [dual 
social and economic structures; both within and between sectors and 
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locations. A key question to be analyzed in case studies will be 
whether, and under which conditions, the remaining sectors and 
locations can benefit from these dynamics. 
Normally, the remaining sectors and locations retain only the less 
productive and less mobile production factors. This reduces the 
overall productivity of these sectors and locations and conse-
quently also the rewards of their specific factors still further. 
This fact will initiate a downward spiral in which the development 
potential of these sectors and locations is successively reduced. 
With the consequent outmigration of the most efficient production 
factors and the reallocation of factors from region-oriented to 
export-base activities, also the satisfaction of regional basic human 
needs becomes increasingly neglected. The provision of regional 
food supply (Taylor, 1973)x~ and of local and regional basic services 
deteriorate in less developed regions and lead to the fact that 
today for many Third World rural areas even such typically rural 
products as food and local basic needs have to be supplied from 
the outside by national or even international agencies. 
Development "from above" expects a process to happen as described 
by Friedmann (1978) 
The only way to expand domestic markets is in something 
like the following sequence: 
foreign demand------ manufactured exports ----expansion 
of secondary and tertiary employment -----increased demand for 
agricultural products~ increased demand for domestic manufactures 
increase in domestic production and employment. 
x) Taylor in this study describes the situation in Kenya where externally 
oriented marketing structures have led to a decline in nutrition levels so 
that, as a result of an "agricultural revolution", the people were worse off 
in 1970 than they were in 1870. 
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In this sequence, everything follows its'natural' course. The 
trouble with the sequence is that it is wrong. Domestic mass 
markets are created, not by foreign demand for the products of 
low-cost labour but by increasing the productivity of the (resident) 
masses ........... " 
( Friedmann, 197B). 
In reality, this sequence turns out to be quite different. For 
many countries (e.g. of Latin America) the following sequence 
would seem much closer to reality: 
Foreign demand export of raw materials 
and staple products 
demand increase for con-
sumption or capital goods 
by national (high-income) 
strata with access to 
external activities and to 
power 
----------=? import substitution 
for mass consumption with 
little increase of broad 
effective demand 
______ ,,, emergence of a dual economy: ---·------- ··>" 
high productivity increase 
----·-->- rationalization of staple ·----> 
export production to com-
pensate for lacking inter-
nal demand increase 
for export commodities and for 
national high income consumption 
and capital goods/ low increase 
of broad national demand for 
standard consumption goods 
import of basic needs, incl. 
food, et . . .......... ? 
This process in fact leads to inverted commodity flows in which the 
less developed areas (with abundant cheap labour and land] increase 
capital inputs (their scarcest factor) into their exports, while 
they increasingly import basic goods for the production of which 
they possess idle factors. This is a typical consequence of the 
comparative cost paradigm of classical economics. 
In most countries, this process may only after a very long (politically 
12 
usually intolerable) time period - if ever - lead to broad economic 
diversification and to a convergence of income along social strata 
and geographical regions. 
The spatial pattern of the urtan and transport system in a process 
of development ''from above" will - both as a result of and as a 
means of facilitating that development - normally also be oriented 
towards external sources of growth and/or economic and political 
dominance (particularly in the former colonial areas). Such an 
externally oriented, usually coastal urban and transport system 
responds very little to requirements of internal accessibility 
for which central places should optimally be located in the gravi-
tational centre but not on the fringe of their hinterland. This -
in addition to the above mentioned inversion of commodity flows -
diminishes still further the level and equity of supply with basic 
needs services. 
In Marxist terminolgy it would mean that the surplus extracted 
from activities in all parts of the country is, through resource 
and factor withdrawals and via unequal terms of trade, being con-
centrated in very few (externally oriented] locations of the respective 
countries, or even tranferred to the exterior. 
It therefore seems that centre-down development strategies would 
be able to actually transmit development impulses to all parts of 
a social system only under very specific and in practice very rare 
conditions. Normally, large-scale organizational linkages between 
areas of greatly differing levels of development will - due to unequal 
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distribution of power, selective factor withdrawals, unequal terms 
of trade, unequal distribution of scale economies, etc. lead to 
increasing spatial divergence rather than to a convergence of living 
levels. In other words, even with explicit regional development 
policies operating through such large-scale private or public 
organizations, the sum of all backwash effects in most cases still 
seem to exceed the spread effects. 
With a "centre-down" development strategy it would seem that this 
can only be avoided if there exist, at the national level, at the 
same time a strong control mechanism avoiding leakages to the exterior 
(control on commodity and factor flows) and a strong redistributive 
mechanism with broad public participation operating in the interior. 
In large countries the same might equally be necessary at one or 
more sub-national levels in order to avoid major concentrations 
of power. Very few developing countries seem to have been willing 
(or able) to do this so far and it will be interesting to see the 
evaluation of relevant experiences, particularly of some of the 
more inward-looking socialist developing countries. 
III. Development "From Below" 
Development "from below" would require that such unilaterial back-
wash effects via power concentration, selective factor withdrawals, 
negative terms of trade, etc. can be restrained and dynamic develop-
mental impulses can be created within less developed areas. 
Instead of optimizing selected factor components at a large (inter-
n at i o n a 1 o r n a t i o n a 1 ) s c a 1 e " ' c r e a m i n g ' t h e h u ma ri a n d r1 a t u r a 1 r e s o u r c 1:c s 
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of favu.::-L,cj s,:;z:7:iments of (national or regional) economies" (Hansen, 
1978, p.29), the basic objective of development from "br3low" is 
the full development of a region's natural resources and human 
skills (what Richardson, 1973, calls "generative" grovJth) at first 
for the equal satisfaction of the basic needs of all strata of 
its population and subsequently for objectives beyond this. Most 
basic needs services are territorially organized and manifest them-
selves most intensely at the level of small-scale social groups 
and local or regional communities. Development "from below" 
therefore requires that the greater part of the surpius created 
through successive specialization of territorially contiguous 
activities should be invested regionally for the diversification of 
the regional economy. This process is expected to occur also at 
successively higher scales. Through the regional retention of at least 
part of the surplus created, integrated economic circuits within 
less developed regions would be promoted (Santo~ 1971; Senghaas, 1977) 
and development impulses would be expected to successively pass 
"upward" from the local through the regional to the national level, 
etc. Policy emphasis therefore will need to be (distinct from 
centre-down strategies'. on: territorially organized basic needs 
services, rural and village development, labor intensive activities, 
small and medium size projects, technology which permits the full 
employment of regional human, natural and institutional resources 
on a territorially integrated basis. 
The basic hypotheses underlying a strategy of development "from below" 
are: 
(1) There is not one uniform but many concepts of development depen-
ding on the natural environm nt of different communities and the 
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development over time of specific cultural and institutional con-
ditions. In fact, these differentiated historically grown cultural 
and institutional conditions represent major factors of development 
potential and should therefore not be subordinated to short term 
pressures of the externally dominated and "anonymous" market mechanism. 
(2) The basic impulses for the formulation and implementation of 
such differentiated concepts of development must come from within 
the respective communities. This requires discarding the presently 
dominant hypotheses that small-scale (local, regional or national) 
communities can develop only through the intermediary of other "more 
highly developed" communities or countries and must do this by 
applying the latter's - usually materially defined - concept of 
development. Discarded must also be the presently dominant hypothesis 
that, in order to achieve this, the poor communities must produce 
more commodities for the demand of the rich ones ("export-base 
concept") at reduced cost and return to their factors [mainly labor 
and natural resources) and that, in return they must receive trans-
fers of capital, technology and organisational skill ("development 
aid") from the higher developed countries. These factor transfers, 
along with the withdrawal of natural resources and unequal terms 
of trade, in fact usually weaken rather than strengthen the compara-
tive development potential of the less developed areas. At the same 
time they reduce the respective communities' capacity to mobilize 
their own capital, technology and organisational skills and thereby 
make them increasingly dependent upon the more developed areas. 
(3) There needs to be a higher degree of national and regional 
self-determination on the degree and type of interaction between 
these ur,1its. Most of the "less developed" countries [defined by 
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developed countries' criteria) are so mainly due to their reduced 
capability for large scale interaction and for providing goods and 
production factors for large-scale (international) interchange 
systems. Many of these communities, however, have a much higher 
potential for small scale interaction [interpersonal social relations, 
group identity, small-scale solidarity, rate of active cultural 
participation) than those of materially highly developed areas. 
These small-scale potentials [related to Allardt's conditions of 
"loving" and "being") are important to human beings although they 
can usually not be exchanged at larger scales. They have use-value 
rather than exchange-value. They therefore do not enter into the 
calculation of "comparative advantage" at large [world-wide) 
scales and are not measured by our usual indicators of development. 
They are, however, affected considerably [usually in a negative 
sense) by the economic, social and political transformations which 
large-scale interchange of commodities and production factors cause. 
Since these small-scale potentials (often operating on an informal 
basis) also are important for such functions as social security, 
health care, environmental protection and education, the quality 
of life in these sectors usually is also detrementally affected by 
factor withdrawals or social transformations caused by large-scale 
economic interchange between areas of differing levels of economic 
development. 
Development "from below" therefore may require a certain degree of 
"selective closure" (StBhr & TBdtling 1977a) on those transfers to 
and from regions or countri s which reduce their potential for 
self-reliant development. This might ~ • by applying controls on raw 
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material or commodity transfers which contribute to negative terms 
of trade and/or by the control of factor transfers (capital, 
technology) which lead to underemployment or idleness of other 
regional production factors or to major external dependence. 
Instead of rn irqjzing the return of selected production 
factors at a large (international) scale, the objective would be 
to increase the overall efficiency of a 1 1 production factors 
of the respective (economically less developed] region in a territorially 
integrated way. This integration of territorially available resources, 
together with the mobilization of territorially organized social 
structures should become the basis for more endogenously initiated 
development impulses. Friedmann (1978) describes such an alterna-
tive process of development as follows: 
"The new industry should be devoted to the production 
of wage goods, of simple products, including tools in daily use. 
The variety is small and the technology is fairly simple. Wage 
goods can be manufactured in small enterprises that are dispersed 
among agropolitan districts. In this way, people will get the 
experience with inventing and with making things. They will 
learn about machines and bookkeeping and marketing lots. 
To build up wage goods production at home, mass production 
with advanced technology must be severely limited. Jet planes 
cannot be matched with gliders in a race ! Successful home pro-
duction of wage goods will eventually create a demand for machinery 
and simple transport equipment. This, too, can be produced at 
home. The new sequence, therefore, will look like this: 
"increased agricultural productivity---industrial diver-
sification in decentralized locations [principally wage 
goods production~ -increased occupation of labor 
increased demand for wage goods --- increased demand for 
machinery and simple transport equipment technological 
and product innovations --- enhanced capacity for export 
of domestic manufactures abroad. 
"To proceed in this way will also help to solve the well-known 
factor proportions problem, i.e., the optimum mix of capital equip-
ment and labor power necessary to produce a given product in light 
of relative economic scarcities." (Friedmann 1978). 
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In Marxist terminology it would mean that the surplus should be 
extracted and utilized in decentralized form: surplus created 
from agricultural production should be retained in rural areas 
in order to facilitate rural industriali=ation and to increase the 
efficiency of less productive (e.g. small and medium-size) agri-
cultural and other rural activities, rather than be extracted 
into urban areas. As labour is usually an abundant factor in less 
developed areas, activities should be promoted which are labour-
intensive, use to a maximum possible regional resources and regionally 
available technology (or external technology adapted to these 
objectives). This will increase effective demand for regional products 
(food, handicrafts,services, agricultural equipment) and thereby 
increase the viability of these sectors in peripheral regions. 
Successively, certain of these activities will be able to increase 
their scale and, beyond their regionally based markets, cater also 
to external demand. Such a modernization process, sustained jointly 
by regional and by external forces, will create demand for inter-
mediate and modern machinery and capital goods industries. The more 
intermediate technology is applied, the more peripheral regions or 
countries will also be able to actively participate in their provision. 
Development of large scale activities and canters will then primarily 
be based on territorially defined (local and regional) inputs and 
demand and correspond to their requirements rather than inversely. 
This means that large cities would not be able to grow as fast as they 
have in the past - which would diminish a key problem of spatial 
development.Hoselitz's [1957) dichotomy between "generative" and 
"parasytic" cities would be rephrased in the sense that cities 
would become generative for their immediate hinterland rather 
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than for an "abstract" interurban system. In this way the hierarchi-
cal urban-industrial system would essentially be determined and 
sustained "from below", that is by the relatively stable (human, 
social, political and environmental) needs and potentials of their 
territorial hinterland and of its population rather than by the 
fortuitious and uncontrollable trickling down of impulses "from 
above". Urban centers would develop primarily as an integrating 
and supporting component of their hinterland, rather than the hinter-
land developing, like in the centre-down strategy, as a function 
of the selective requirements of the urban system. 
The spatial pattern of urban-industrial development resulting will 
be comparatively decentralized and regionalized. As industrialization 
and service growth are based primarily on demand and resources 
within their respective region and not essentially on export base 
activities (which should be promoted later at successive stages), 
the urban system will nationally and regionally tend to be more 
inward-oriented than the existing coastal patterns of developing 
countries resulting from the earlier described "center-cown" process. 
Urban centres will tend to maximize accessibility within their 
regions (from which their development primarily depends) rather 
than maximizing accessibility to the outside. Inward oriented 
urban systems which maximize internal accessibility provide the 
best conditions for equal provision of basic needs services to all 
parts of the population. It corresponds to the urban pattern of 
most countries which were able to establish an urban system and an 
institutionally disaggregated (e.g. multi-tier federal; nation state 
before large-scale transport integration and industrialization took 
place. 
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A strategy of development "from below" would for less developed 
areas need to combine selected elements of what Hirschman (1958) 
has called advantages of integration (or "surrender of sovereigr~1ty"J 
with selected elements of advantages of separatism or "equivalents 
of sovereignty". "If only we ,:::ould in some respects treat a region 
as though it were a country and in some others treat a country 
as though it were a region, we would indeed get the best of both 
worlds and be able to create situations particularly favorable 
to development" (Hirschman 1958, p.199]. Is this possible ? 
The "advantages of integration" for less developed areas would 
seem to lie particularly in realtively free and self-determined 
access to technological and organizational innovation and the experien-
ces made with them, and in access to potential markets for products 
for which less developed areas possess a comparative cost advantage. 
The advantages of "equivalents of sovereignty" would seem to lie 
particularly in cultural and institutional semi-autonomy of less 
developed areas and in the possibility to introduce or maintain a 
certain degree of "spatial closure" (Stohr & Todtling 1977a) or 
of a "cellular economy" (Oonnithorne, 1972), in which barriers to 
free resource withdrawals, to negative terms of trade, as well as 
to a further concentration of power would be drawn along territorial 
lines of different hierarchical levels. For less developed countries 
or regions such a strategy can also be argued on an economic rationale, 
as these regions and countries are 
... ''facing the pressures of excess demand pushing against limited supplies, 
and responding to bottle-necks by encouraging all levels of the economy 
to explore the possibilities of bringing 'own' (regional) resources, as 
yet untapped, into utilization; in other words self-reliance does not 
entail some 'inefficient' [in the neo-classical sense) reallocation 
of existing resources, but rather the productive use of resources pre-
viously ur1kno1tm, urrnoticed or wasted." (Snead, 1975). 
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Another intorpretation cari be derived from Machlup (1977) in the sense 
that particularly in developing societies public goods, including basic 
services, "the attainment of widely held collective objectives"in-
cluding intangibles, and the broad mobilization of autochthonous 
human, natural and organizational resources can in fact be more effi-
ciently provided at smaller scales and with different territorial 
delimitations than the production of individual private goods. 
Modifying Machlup's (1977, p.35] contention one could say that 
if the production of public goods is extended to the scale at which 
the production of private goods is considered optimal (not including 
external costs], such public goods may be u~duly b~rdencd by external 
costs which afflict 1Jpon thPm very unfavorable cost-benefit relations 
or make them unfeasible altogether. 
At least for a "cellular" socialist country such as China it is main-
tained that self-reliance together with decentralized planning as 
introduced in 1975 did not reduce the development potential of 
the poorest regions but " 
vincial differentials 
seems to have narrowed interpro-
even before the important state inter-
provincial transfer of funds have been taken into account" (Paine, 
1976]. It may well be that the mobilization of additional resources 
in the regions beyond increasing the production and income of 
even the poorer regions - may in fact increase aggregate growth and 
thereby at the same time make more funds available centrally for addi-
tional redistributive purposes. These would be essential questions 
to clarify in individual case studies wherever data sources for this 
rather complex question can be made available. 
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As far as public intervention is concerned, investment policy would 
need to be oriented more towards the rural base and the lower echelons 
of the urban hierarchy (including the institutional strengthening 
of the informal sector there) rather than concentrating primarily 
on the top levels of the urban industrial hierarchy and the sectoral 
and geographic clusters existing there; price policy would need to 
bias terms of trade more in favor of typically rural products. 
Apart frum thescc rc1ther fragmentary looking strategy elemr:,nt:c,, is therro 
a more consistent theoretical body or more coherent practical experience 
available on development processes "from below" ? 
Dudley Seers in his paper "The New Meaning of Development'' (1977) 
maintained recently that we still lack a theory for an alternative 
paradigm of development: 
" ... we do not yet understand much about what self-reliance 
implies for development strategies, but some of the economic aspects 
are obvious enough. They include reducing dependence on imported 
necessities, especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, 
capital equipment and expertise. This would involve changing consump-
tion patterns as well as increasing the relevant productive capacity. 
Redistribution of income would help, but policies would also be needed 
to change living styles at given income levels - using taxes, price 
policies, advertising and perhaps rationing. In many countries, self-
reliance would also involve increasing national ownership and control, 
especially of sub-soil assets, and improving national capacity for 
negotiating with transnational corporations. 
There are other implications as well, especially in cultural policy. 
These are more country-specific, but as a general rule, let us say 
that 'development' now implies, inter alia, reducing cultural de 
pendence on one or more of the great powers - i.e. increasing the use 
of national languages in schools, allotting more television time 
to programmes produced locally [or in neighbouring countries), 
raising the proportion of higher degrees obtained at home, etc .. 
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won this approach, development plans' would henceforward not put 
the main emphasis on overall growth rates, or even on new patterns 
of distribution. The crucial targets would be for [il ownership as 
well as output in the leading economic sectors; (ii) consumption 
patterns that economised on foreign exchange (including imports, such 
as cereals and oil); [iii) institutional capacity for research and nego-
tiation; (iv) cultural goals like those suggested above, depending on 
the country concerned. The Third Malaysian Plan (1976) partially 
reflects this approach, though it has, of course, been the basis 
of Japanes development strategy for a century. 
Of course, an emphasis on reducing dependence does not necessarily 
mean aiming at autarchy. How far it is desirable, or even possible to 
go in that direction, depends on a country's size, location and natural 
resources; on its cultural homogeneity and the depth of its traditions; 
on the extent to which its economy needs imported inputs to satisfy 
consumption patterns which have to be taken - at least in the short 
term - as political minima. The key to a development strategy of the 
type suggested is not to break all links, which would almost anywhere 
be socially damaging and politically unworkable, but to ado~t a selective 
approach to external influences of all types." [Seers, 1977, 
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IV. In Search of a Theory of Development "From Below" Some Historical 
Parallels 
Niles Hansen (1978) has shown that the theoretical foundations of 
development strategies "from above" practiced durint the past two 
decades stem mainly from the economic theory dominant during the past 
quarter of a century, influenced strongly by neo-classical economic 
thought. Such a strategy is still widely considered a prerequisite 
for further economic progress. 
The lack of an alternative theory and practice of development''from 
below" 1t1hich Seers alludes to, in fact refers only to this period, 
however. It is true that during this period development "from above" 
has been the dominant paradigm in the theory and practice of economic 
policy in particular, and in the evolution of the two systems of super-
powers in general. With respect to the Western hemisphere, this was 
the case inspite of the assumptions of classical and neo-classical 
economic thought based on individual and independent private decision-
making, which is the extreme opposite of the development "from above" 
paradigm. In hindsight this contradiction becomes clear, however, as 
classical or 'positive' economics was concerned essentially with indi-
vidual resource alloca :ion for the production of "private goods" 
(Machlup, 1977). The increasingly important production of public goods 
for collective objectives, however, needs to focus essentially on 
external effects and therefore requires different allocation mechanisms. 
,j : t -i ~J ·, c-: 
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"from above" as we shall try to show for the case of Central Europe. 
This means that a reversal of existing trends of development "from 
above" may not be as unfeasible as it might look from an isolated 
economic perspective which maintains that any such change would 
bring an unsustainable loss in efficiency and socio-political cohesion. 
The swing between these two approaches in the past seems to have been 
related also to changing scales of societal interaction and to a 
changing subordination of rationalizing economic activity under 
broader societal norms (philosophical, religious, political, social, 
etc.) or vice-versa. Let me give a few short - and therefore certainly 
overly simplified - examples. X) For this purpose I will have to go 
back into the history of economic and societal thought much further 
than Niles Hansen has in describing the centre-down paradigm which 
has been dominant during the past 25 years: 
xx) In the past 2.500 years the scale of societal and spatial inter-
action in specific cultural areas seems to have changed various times 
from periods of dominating small-scale societal interaction (from 
"below") to periods of dominating large-scale interaction (from "above") 
and vice versa. This seems to have been associated also with changes 
in the dominance of socio-political institutions from small to large 
scale and vice-versa. Furthermore 1 it was usually also associated 
with changes in the dominant power structure between different social, 
political or religious groups. 
x) A concise and very pointed description of these changing trends including 
their spatial dimension is contained in Heinrich (1964) 
xx)This sequence probably also extends further back, as still more spotty evi-
dence from studies e.g. on the Neolithic period seems to indicate (Renfre~ 1973a,bl 
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Periods of primarily small-scale spatial interaction ("from below") 
tended to be irrationally and metaphysically dominated; they focussed 
on what Touraine (1976) calls "ideological" accumulation. Functional 
(rational, incl.economicl activities and "functional" accumulation 
(Touraine) were usually firmly embedded in - nr 0 v~n c~ or~inatP~ to -
broader societal norms (metaphysical, institutional, social, cultural, 
ritual, etc.). These comparatively small economic and societal 
interaction radii (compared to those of preceding or following periodsxJ 
might be explained by the fact that irrationally (incl.emotionally, 
sensually) based human interaction is limited to much smaller scales 
than functional (rationally, abstract, economically) based human 
interaction (Hall, 1966; Greenbie, 1976; Laszlo, 1977}. Whereas the 
first kind of interaction takes place mainly in concrete [spatially 
delimitated) territorial space, the latter takes place primarily 
in abstract (functionally delimited) space (Friedmann, 1978) and 
can therefore bridge distance much easier. To put it in Allardt's 
terms, human conditions of "loving" and of "being" depend much more 
on small-scale interaction than human conditions of "having" which 
can benefit considerably from large-scale interaction. 
Laszlo (1977) states that today the scales of functional [rationally 
determined) interaction have by far outgrown perceived (emotionally 
determined) interaction scales. According to Laszlo, this creates 
successive destabilizing feedback effects from higher to lower inter 
action scales - mainly via spurts of innovation - e.g. through 
the impact of world wide technological change upon small-scale 
social, cultural, and political structures and interaction patterns. 
x)Laszlo [1974) assumes a continuous increase of spatial interaction scales 
through history, whereas accord to our hypothesis the spatial expansion 
(facilitated by advances in production, transport and communications technology) 
oscillatt?d, iri additior1 to thi.s long-term trend, also considr3rutJ1y b,3tweer1 rEJtim1Eilly 
and irrationally dominated historical periods. 
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In periods of dominating large-scale interaction ("from above"], 
such as during the past 25 years, functional (rational, incl.economic) 
activities gained considerable autonomy from broader societal (meta-
physical, institutional, social, ritual etc.] norms and often even 
became supra-ordinate over them. This usually was accompanied 
by a rapid acceleration in the rate of innovation in many fields 
including production, transport and communications technology. 
These innovations promoted the rapid expansion of interaction scales 
which functional processes could readily bridge. These periods of 
development "from above" - possibly due to the destabilizing effects 
of accelerated innovation (Laszlo) - in general tended to be much 
shorter than the preceding or subsequent periods of development 
"from below". These changes seem to have oscillated around a long 
term trend of increasing interaction scales, but have periodically 
reduced and thereby prevented it from moving ahead at a faster rate. 
The following are examples of what would seem to be such periods 
of development "from above" and "from below". They are taken from 
only a relatively small part of the world, namely the Mediterrenean 
and Central Europe, and are not continuous over time even for these 
areas. More systematic analysis will be required on these issues 
and it is hoped that the present hypotheses will arouse the interest 
of historians to undertake more systematic studies on the inter-
relations between socio-economic interaction scales, the size of 
socio-political institutions and spatial disparities in living levels. 
28 
In the Greek Polis, urban and economic development particularly in 
its initial phase was essentially self-reliant (sometimes even autarchic 
wit~in city states) and rather rigidly subordinated to the philosophical 
framework of Nicomachean ethics and their norms of justice rooted in 
the works of Platon and Aristotle. The Polis was a narrowly delimited 
territorial unit usually without tendency towards contiguous expansion. 
Instead, more or less rigidly organized city leagues were established. 
On the whole, this period lasted for about half a millenium. 
During the first l 1/2 centuries A.O. (Ceasar to Trajan) the Roman 
Empire created the first "world economy" with a comparatively well 
organized monetary, credit and transport system, and relatively 
little subordination to metaphysical norms. 
In the 3rd and 4th centuries A.O. there followed a reversal to a 
large number of small-scale economic areas, a receding of the monetary 
and credit economy and an increasing orientation towards agricultural 
and rural forms. 
During the Middle Ages economic activities were for over 4 centuries 
subjected to a multiplicity of religious and social restrictions, with 
emphasis on the concept of individual and common "need" determining 
a "justum precium", the prohibition of taking interest on capital, etc .. 
The subjection of economic activities to philosophical, religious 
and social norms introduced important elements of solidarity (as 
against those of competition], provided for stability (as against 
the dynamics of an autonomous economic process) and in general reduced 
the rate of societal change: the relatively small scale frameworks 
of the Greek Polis and of the Medieval system lasted for 4-5 centuries 
each, that of the Roman Empire only for l 1/2 centuries. 
Towards the end of the Middle Ages, there occurred in Central Europe, a 
change from the relatively self-contained small-scale agricultural and 
rurally dominated interaction terns of the 12. and 13. centuries to the 
increasing interaction radii of Mercantilism. The latter was intended to 
SE-3rve "as a unifying system" attempting to overcome the "economic disir1tegratior:" 
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that had been caused by feudal powers, by the system of river tolls 
and road tolls, and by "local disintegration in other spheres" (Heckscher 1955). 
It was based on state guided promotion of handicraft and urban based 
trade which created decentralized urban-centred regional economies and 
in which rural areas became strictly subservient to their urban centres. 
In the Mercantilist period, for the first time,explicit economic policy 
by the state existed and was scarcely embedded in metaphysical norms. 
The major objective was to increase the wealth of the State as a whole 
by producing a sufficient amount of goods required for the nourishment, 
material needs and comfort of its inhabitants. The (aggregate) positive 
balance of trade became an overriding objective, oriented towards the 
development of the state's economic potential and the reduction of foreign 
economic influence. Major instruments were the prohibition of the import 
of final products and of the export of raw materials and food products. 
All foreign commodities, particularly those serving "unnecessary luxury" 
rather than real needs were banned from import and later on subjected 
to high tariffs. It was (though on a small scale for the first time) a 
centralist state-run policy to develop to a maximum the full economic 
potential of individual states. The emphasis was on urban activities in 
a larger national context to safeguard its political independence. 
As a reaction to the previous urban and handicraft-oriented state-run 
economic policy, there emerged in the second half of the 18th century, 
particularly in Central Europe, the first partial laissez-faire policy 
of the 'Physiocrats'. Laissez-faire principles, however, were mainly applied 
to commerce as their application in agriculture (the Physiocrats' key 
sector according to QuesnBy's Tableau EconomiqueJ would have made large 
rur~ regions idle. Free 7rade thereby essentially fortified the power 
of the agricultural and of the administrative sectors. The directly pro-
ductive employment potential of cities was minimal as industrialization 
had barely starts~ handicraft and trade were considered "sterile" activi 
ties; at the same time rural unrest of the Peasant Wars was still in memory. 
Tariff protection for agriculture, the key sector, was therefore a necessary 
exception to general laissez-faire attitudes, a restriction aiming at 
full employment of natural resources, especially of agricultural land. 
Towards the end of the 18th century finally rationalism, the enlighten-
ment, classical economic theory and free trade philosophy came to dominate. 
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Along with it went in many European countries the elimination of rigid 
institutional restrictions in the fields of artisanry and commerce (guilds) 
and of rural activities (feudalism). The previous small-scale interaction 
units were transformed into larger, internally increasingly uniformed 
political entities of nation states: France, England, Sweden, Russia, 
in the 18th century; Germany, Italy and USA in the 19th century, etc .. 
These nation states enlarged their areas of influence also in non-European 
continents. 
This period saw a major extension of European concepts of development to 
other continents. In the previous Mercantilist and Physiocrat periods, 
colonies had mainly been considered as sources of prestige, of monetary 
wealth (precious metals) and of luxury goods (spices, tea, etc.) 
while their social and cultural systems on the whole were left intact. With 
the emerging technological and industrial revolution in Europe in the 
latter part of the 18th century, however, the role of the colonies in-
creasingly was transformed into that of becoming sources of raw materials 
for industry (cotton, wool, vegetable oils, jute, dyestuffs, etG) and into 
potential markets for industrial products. In order to attain this, major 
social, cultural and legal changes were imposed upon the colonies by their 
motherlands: (1) changes in existing land and property arrangements in 
the direction of private property in land and the expropriation of land 
for plantation agriculture, (2) creation of a labour supply for commercial 
agriculture and mining by means of direct forced labour and indirect 
measures aimed at generating a body of wage-seeking labourers, [3) spread 
of the use of money and exchange of commodities by imposing money payments 
for taxes and land rent and by inducing a decline of home industry, and 
(4) where the precolonial society already had a developed industry (e.g. 
cotton goods in India), curtailment of production and exports by native 
producers. These changes were perpetuated by the introduction of legal 
codes, administrative techniques and the culture and language of the domi-
nant power and the promotion of a local elite willing to cooperate with 
the colonial power (Magdoff H., 1978). Industrialization had thus led 
also to a socio-political and cultural penetration of the colonies. 
The economic sphere had finally liberated itself from century old 
religious, ethical, social and institutional restrictions and started 
to evolve as an autonomous field of activity. With rapid technological 
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innovation and capital accumulation it turned from being subjected 
to, into the role of becoming a driving force for social, political, 
1 . . X} . f . re ig1ous and environmental trans ormation. The latter broader 
societal and environmental spheres became relegated to the status 
of "externalities" of economic processes, both in the original 
motherlands and successively also in their dependent colonies. 
Former principles of solidarity, satisfaction of basic needs, 
justice, and integrated resource mobilization became substituted by 
the new criteria of competition, efficiency, selective world-wide 
resource optimization and survival of the fittest. Along with the 
successive elimination of obstacles to increasing efficiency such 
as religious, ethnical and institutional barriers went the reduction 
of state barriers and the introduction of a nation less and space less 
economic doctrine: intra-national and international trade became 
institutionally less and less differentiated. Tariffs were discarded 
as distorting comparative advantage and discriminating between 
social classes (by presenting gifts to the landowners ! J. Other 
territorially manifested "externalities" in spheres such as the 
environment, employment of human and natural resource, social condi-
tions, etc. became increasingly neglected. It was assumed (as later 
also in neo-classical economics) that under conditions of perfect 
competition and full mobility of factors, private efficiency and 
social welfare would converge. Foreign competition would modernize 
national manufacturing and the principle of comparative advantage 
would increase efficiency, reduce prices and as a consequence of it 
also wages, increase capital accumulation and thereby further raise 
x)IH Calvinism rcliiious achievement even mBn fest 
accum~lation of economic wealth. 
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overall efficiency. Efficiency would also be increased by increasing 
radii of spatial interaction. The transformation from patterns of 
development embedded in stabilizing complex societal norms, to a 
philosophy of development via autonomous and spaceless economic 
processes, had taken place. Devoid of institutional or other societal 
constraints, a rate of quantitative growth, but also of qualitative 
deterioration and instability never known before had started. 
In economic theory and policy, locally or regionally manifested 
criteria for resource allocation such as ''absolute cost" or "need" 
were substituted by the concept of (worldwide) comparative advantage. 
This had a number of important consequences: 
(1) it cemented the dominance of economic criteria over "external" 
(social, cultural, environmental, etc.) ones as described above; 
(2) it promoted the systematic over- or underexploitation of terri-
torially organized or less mobile resources (especially of land, 
human and institutional resources); 
(3) it initiated an increasing exposure of local and regional commu-
nities to external (national and international economic and other} 
influences. The level of development and the wealth of a (regional 
or national) community was not determined any more by the amount of 
resources (material, cultural, institutional etc.) this community 
was able to mobilize for the satisfaction of its own needs, but 
rather by the value attached to the exportable segments of its 
resources (selected from outside) in exchange for imported goods. 
The value of an imported commodity was determined not by its local 
or regional production cost but by the cost of export goods exchanged 
for them, and by the elasticity of national demand for foreign 
goods compared to that of foreign demand for national goods 
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(equation of international demand, Mill 1848). This meant that 
territorially defined communities were not the masters of their 
destiny any more but became subservient to the "objective" mecha-
nism of worldwide commodity and factor markets and to those (national 
and international) functional groups able to control them; 
(4) it created and perpetuated situations of "underdevelopment" 
along territorial lines in which, following the previous argument, 
"less developed" regions or countries, in order to develop, had to 
reduce the cost (and price] of their export commodities [based mainly 
on an abundant supply of natural resources and cheap labour) in 
order to pay for imported finished goods and capital equipment (based 
mainly on inputs of scarce capital and technology); the unequal distri-
bution of the surplus reaped thereby steadily widened 
territorial disparities in living levels; 
(5) it promoted at the same time inequalities between social strata, 
particularly in developing countries, as the required reduction in 
the cost of export commodities had to be achieved mainly via the 
reduction of real wage inputs in order to pay for imports of 
consumption or capital goods required by a small regional or national 
elite; 
(6) it promoted the extension of (private and later also State) capi 
talism throughout major parts of the world as the "less developed" 
regions and countries, in order to close their capital and balance 
of payments gaps, had to import capital or take on long term loans 
and other commitments. 
Economic interaction in fact seemed to have overcome distance friction 
as commodity and capital flows were abl to reach the most remote 
34 
corners of the globe. Aggregate economic growth and efficient use 
of scarce factors (particularly capital) advanced at a rate unheard 
of before. But territorially and other distributionally and struc-
turally articulated "externalities", such as economic inequality, 
forceful transformations of political, cultural and social structures, 
fluctuations and disparities in the level of employment of human and 
natural resources at national, regional and local levels also exceeded 
any measure known before. 
It is therefore not surprising that the pendulum soon swung back again 
in the early 19th century from this rationalistic conception of economy 
and society (enlightenment, classical economics) to the more irrational 
and metaphysical conceptions of Romanticism in Europe. The timeless and 
ubiquitous rationality of the previous period x) was substituted by a 
renewed emphasis on historical and territorial specificity (e.g. the German 
"historical" school of economics); the economy once more came to be 
considered not as an autonomous field of activity but as being subordinated 
to normative societal and institutional constraints (e.g. by "institutionalists" 
such as Thornstein Veblen in the USA). In contrast to the previous rationally 
oriented period of the enlightenment and of functionally oriented classical 
economics, aesthetic, irrational, qualitative and structural elements - often 
defined in territorial terms - came to the foreground such as man's relation 
to nature (Rousseau), Fichte's "Closed Commercial State" aiming at maximum 
resource mobilization for equal supply to all population strata; List's 
theory of ::-;ro,::icJ i::t8rsector,=il "mu-:::ually supporting" national economic 
development which, particularly for a country's intermediate agricultural-
industrial transition phase, demanded the introduction of educational tariffs 
(List 1840)xx). Free trade was considered admissible only between countries 
of equal stage of economic development and only once they had articulated 
internal structures which were able to retain the vital elements required for 
their development, letting dissipate to the outside only the superavit. Other-
wise, it was pointed out, free trade would cause external dependency and 
x)Adam MUller called Smith's classical economics a theory of the successive 
radical dissolution and dismembration of the state [MUller 1809). 
xx) Seng hems ( 1977 l has dealt extensively with the relation between List's 
economic theory and that of self-reliant or "dissociative" development. 
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instability of production (Hildebrand, 184B; Lehr, 1677). Beyond momentary 
price and market conditions, the state has to consider the national future 
and the long range development of an integral societal system (Schmoller,1B73). 
In contrast to the individualism dominant in the prior period of classical 
economics, group solidarity again became an important objective and in this 
sense constituted a transition to subsequent Christian social but also 
Communist social theories of the second half of the 19th century and sub-
sequent periods. 
Christian (especially catholic) social theory in fairly consistent manner 
over time, starting from the encyclica "rerum novarum "(1891) onward, 
l 
emphasized principles of solidarity and subsidiarity;'both in spatial and 
in social terms. In spatial terms this manifested itself in a call for 
federalism, in social and economic terms by the preference for a "corporate" 
structure of society based on natural law (in contrast to Fascism; not domi 
nated by the state, however). 
Communist social theory was much more exposed to change over time. 
From a socialism and communism very much "from below" in their early anarchic, 
utopian and cooperative forms it moved increasingly to a socialism "from 
above" in the form of State Communism and Leninism, intended to operate 
not only from the national but also from the international level downward. 
It would go far beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the very complex 
development of theory and practice of these doctrines in more detail. More 
recently however, we have all observed a tendency for the lowering of the 
scale of societal reform to national (Euro-Communism) and even small group 
levels, both in the East and the West. 
Regarding economic interaction, World War I and the inter-war period of 
economic crisis led to an abrupt break-down of large-scale economic inter-
actions and to a trend towards national economic self-sufficiency (Hilgerdt, 
1942) and of national political solidarity. For many developing countries 
the breakdown of the civilian overseas shipping network and the change 
of most industrialized countries to a war respectively crisis economy triggered 
import substitution and initial industrialization, thereby reinforcing 
intra-national economic circuits. 
x~functions which subordinate or local organizations perform effectively belong 
more properly to them than to a dominant central organization"(cf.Webster's 
Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 1959]. 
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After World War II in the late 1950's - particularly in the capi-
talist hemisphere - a successive replacement took place of the 
foregoing dominantly territorial approach by again a functional one 
in matters of both economic and spatial development. This can be 
related to the efforts for a reconstruction of Europe and to the 
emergence of neo-classical and neo-positivistic scientific thinking. 
In economic development theory and practice this trend was initiated 
by Perroux [1955] in an attempt to show that the economies of 
nations (in this case Germany of post World War II] could grow not 
only by expanding their national borders but also by input-output 
relations with external dynamic sectors. Hansen (1978] has excellently 
analyzed this evolution of functional thinking in economic theory 
which constituted the basis for centre-down development strategies. 
For the field of spatial development theory and practice, Friedmann 
(1978) has related this transformation of theory and practice to 
the introduction of the concept of the urban system as a national 
network of interaction nodes (rather than the previous concern for 
individual cities) and to the definition of systems of growth 
centres through which development was expected to filter "down" 
to all parts of a national territory (Berry, 1972). Friedmann (1978] 
has also demonstrated in concrete terms how,e.g. in the LJ.S.A., 
regional planning has in the late 1950's shifted its major concern 
from contiguous territorial space to discrete functional space. 
In the last two chapters of his book Friedmann presents a similar 
finding also for international development policy which, as he tries 
to show, in the past decades predominantly has attempted to solve 
national and regional development problems and inequalities with 
what we here call strategies of development "from above". 
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This is about where we stand today or stood around the middle of 
the 1970's. Since then the call for a reversal of development theory 
and practice which, as Friedmann (1978) has shown, had started 
already at the end of the 1960's during the "Second Development 
Decade", became stronger and manifested itselves in thinking such 
as that expressed in the new periodical "Development Dialogue" 
(Dag Hammarskjold Foundation
1 
LJppsala, since 1975), in that of the 
International Foundation for Development Alternatives (Geneva), 
in a great number of so-called "basic needs"strategies (however 
fuzzy the term may be} initiated several years ago by the Inter-
national Labour Office and successively introduced into the programs 
of most international development organizations such as the World 
Bank, the continental Development Banks, the LJ.N. Regional Commissions 
and affiliated Planning Institutes (particularly those for Asia 
and Africa). 
Some large-scale orga11jb'ltions such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Laxenburg, 
Austria) are trying to develop methods for a more balanced inte-
gration of these large-scale complex systems by modelling approaches 
towards "Redistribution with Growth" (Chenery et al. 1977 and a 
number of successive applications of this model) and by the application 
of systems analysis (IIASA). It is interesting to see that a number 
of the applied studi s based on the 'Redistribution with Growth" 
model come to the conclusion that the ultimate determinants for 
the successful application of such large-scale balancing strategies 
are basic structural reforms within the respective societies accom-
panied by a redistribution of power, of wealth and of income 
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(Adelman and Robinson 1978}, but none of these analyses indicates how 
these crucial structural transformations are to be brought about. 
At the same time there is an increasing call for more "self-reliant" 
development (however fuzzy also this term remains). initially for 
national units, but more recently also for sub-national regional 
and even rural communities (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977;. 
All these efforts are still rather diffuse and it is impossible 
to do them justice in the present context for limitations of scope, 
time and space. But their features are consistently becoming clearer 
and more coherent and may well lead to what Friedmann (1978) has 
called the immanent paradigm shift in development thinking and 
also in the doctrine of spatial development. 
We have, in these brief sketches, shown that development doctrine 
in the past has changed between different mixes of development 
"from below" and "from above". Individual stages have at times 
gone to extremes on either side and swung back again. We have made 
this description without wanting to insinuate any historical de-
terminism or an automatic (and inescapable) historical periodicity. 
But it appears that there is some association - though of course 
to varying degrees - between on the one hand predominantly rationally 
guided periods, large-scale societal interaction patterns, large-scale 
formal organizations, an emphasis on urban activities, a neglect 
f o r m a n e n v i r o n m e n t r e l a t i o n s , a s u b - ,:J r · ·::i \/ r - u t i 1 1 ;-: il ;:: 1_ 1-J r G i' r, cJ t u r ,i J. 
r ,=, d r"' .1 2 r·, Df rurr~jj dr~t~\Jj_ j_(~_i_? .. Tf1~Sr~' 2JlD 
many features of what we here call "development from above". - On the 
other hand, predominantly non-rationally guided periods seem to be 
associated with a narrowing of societal interaction scales, a pre-
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ference for informal organization, an emphasis for rural activities, 
love of landscape and nature, and a general emphasis on man-environ-
ment relations. These periods have many features in common with 
what in this paper we call "development from below". 
The swing from the periods of development "from above" to those 
"from below" in many cases seems to have been associated with one or 
several of the following phenomena: 
(ll extension of interaction and dominance scales beyond the 
conflict resolving capacity of the respective society 
(2) resistance against pressure for institutional and cultural 
penetration and uniformation; 
(3) increasing disparities in living levels and in wealth, in part 
caused objectively by large-scale resource withdrawals and commodity 
flows and in part perceived only subjectively due to increasing scales 
of communication and the ensuing 
and preference patterns; 
uniformation of aspirations 
(4) increasingly unequal utilization and partial idleness of human, 
institutional and natural, especially rural resources; 
(5) neglect of the broad provision of basic needs and lack of 
broader system -wide solidarity; 
(6) increasing ire ,st,i.l:i.t\/ ,;y:c,c:crr,:~ due to the lack of broader 
common societal norms. 
e P in~s are cri~ical issues of today's world-wide problems. 
We have in our analysis dealt mainly with the evolution of development 
doctrine in parts of Europe. For long periods (at least till the end 
of the Middle Ages) the evolution of possibly comparable doctrine 
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in other parts of the world may have followed different paths, at 
least with varying time sequences. Starting with the European 
Enlightenment, with industrialization and Capitalist expansion, 
however, the development doctrine of Europe (and later also of 
North Americaand the Soviet Union) penetrated more and more into 
other parts of the world and have led to a small number of world-wide 
development paradigms, all essentially operating with mechanisms 
which we have here called "from above". 
The present demand of many materially "less developed" countries -
as well as of materially "less developed" areas and social groups 
of industrialized countries - for more self-reliant development may 
in fact be an effort not only to escape from - or to change - the 
established economic and institutional channels of centre-down develop-
ment but also to change the present predominant value system oriented 
towards rationalistic and material objectives and steered by large-
scale interaction and large-scale organizations. 
Is it a paradigm shift starting from the functional and geographic 
peripheries - distant from the major nodes of the present global 
interaction system - which have been increasingly postergated by 
t h i s v a l u e s y s t e m a n d t h e i r: s t i t u t i c, n d 1 s T: r u c :.J r r-, 
Such an alternative strategy of dev lop en '' f r o m b e J CJ V'J 1' l ht cit 
least for certain part ,~ f t h wor:d and~~ sioly for a trar itional 
period be the only way to escape with lasting effects from a 
downward spiral of underdevelopment. 
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V.Problems of Transition from Development "From Above" to Develop -
ment "from Below" 
Most developing countries have historically been exposed to external 
interaction and colonial dependence for varying lengths of time. 
The question therefore in most cases (except possibly for some pre-
capitalist societies) is not how to start a new development "from 
below" (as some European and other countries have in alternating 
stages done centuries ago) but rather whether and how it is possible 
for developing and other countries today to transform the recently 
emerged sectoral and spatial pattern of development "from above" 
to incorporate more elements of development "from below", and 
thereby reduce existing social and spatial disparities in levels 
of development. One of the problems of development "from below" is 
that it is neither a uniform concept to strive for nor a uniform 
transition process to go through. 
Recent development "from above" assumed that the ultimate objective 
for each country and region should be to reach a high degree of 
in dust r i a 1 i at ion and urban i :=at ion re s em b ling t he s t ru· c tu re s of 
the "most developed" countries today by a unilineal proc s of in-
creasing the use of capital, technology and energy, and by utilizing 
ever increasing agglomeration and scale economies in order to 
participate with increasing specialization in the world-v1ide market 
X) 
according to their comparative advantages in factor endowment. 
x)Among many other critiques, it has been shown that this speciali~ation does 
not take place regional 1 y by commodities according to each region's 
relative factor endowment (which would provide for equal levels of factor employ-
ment of all regions) but rather functionally by production factors 
and activity types, whereby the highly developed areas dominate the production 
factors with surplus values (capital, technology) Of the entire system 
as well as the key functions (research and development, decision making), whereas 
less developed areas alize in the provision of c labour and natural 
resources with little participation in the surplus created [Streeten 1974, p.2G2; 
St6hr & TBdtling, 1977b) 
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Development "from below", instead, means defining a diversity of 
structural objectives and transitior1 paths - not determined pre 
dominantly by the possiblity and necessity of world~ide commodity 
and factor interactions, but rather by the totality of the regionally 
available resource endowment, of historically grown social structures, 
the value system and objectives of the respective regional and natio-
nal communities. From this derives that such objectives and transi-
tion paths have to be defined with the broadest possible participa-
tion of the respective communities. 
This necessary diversity of development strategies is conditioned not 
or,ly by the varying exposure of different regions and countries 
to functional dependence from outside and to development from 
"above" ti U t; r3 S 0 by the degree to which their urban and trans-
port system is presently oriented to the outside, but also by the 
degree to which egalitarian structures already exist within these 
communities. For pre-capitalist societies which have interacted 
little with the world-system this might be comparatively easy, p~r-
ticularly if they are internally relatively large and have fairly 
egalitarian social structures. 
The possibilities and requirements of changing formerly externally 
oriented functional and geographical structures to more region-ser-
ving and equitable ones vary accordingly: regions or countries 
with a high degree of external interaction [and possibly dependence), 
with small internal markets but high-value saleable resources may 
in fact need to go at 
- capital goods import - export diversification sequence, described 
by Paauw and Fei (1973] for "small oper1 economies" such as TcJiwan 
:,port 
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and Thailand. Other, larger regions or countries with sizeable 
potential internal markets, few saleable resources and strong 
autochthonous cultural traits may find the change to a more self-
reliant development strategy not only easier but also more useful 
for solving their own problems (various regions of India may be 
cases in point). 
Equally, countries with a strongly outward oriented urban and 
transport system may have more difficulties in moving towards 
self-reliant development than countries with an internally 
oriented urban and transport system. There seems to be a relatively 
strong relationship between the direction (inward or outward) of 
the dominant functional relations of an economic and social system 
and the spatial pattern (inward or outward oriented) of its urban 
and transport network (Appalraju and Safier 1976; Taafe, Morrill, 
Gould, 1973). Some countries have (maybe intuitively) already 
reacted to this fact and made drastic steps towards changing the 
spatial structure of their urban and transport network, e.g. by trans-
ferring their national capital city from an outward oriented (coastal) 
location to an inward oriented, central one (Brazil, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Tanzania, ' X l et C. 1 • It would be interesting to see to 
which extent the change in the location of the national capital in 
individual countries has actually been able to change the entire 
spatial structure of the urban system and of spatial disparities 
x] This does not necessarily mean that all these countries have transformed 
their spatial system in order to facilitate social and economic change. In some 
cases, such as in Brazil, it rather seems that the opening up of the Interior 
by new roads and the creation of the new capital Brasilia in the Interior, were 
in part an escape valve to compensate for the lack of economic and social change 
in coastal areas, particularly in the North-East. 
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in living levels. 
Finally, it is often put in doubt whether societal change towards 
more egalitarian social, economic and political structures can be 
initiated from within local, regional or even national societies. 
External influence transmitted through interaction with external 
change agents is frequently considered a prerequisite for bringing 
about more egalitarian social, economic and political structures. 
Contrary evidence that such change can also be initiated by internal 
forces is maybe not so spectacular and therefore not as widely 
publicized as external intervention (as an extreme of external influence] 
but has recently been provided in a number of instances. A few 
examples of such endogenous change since World War II have been 
Yugoslavia, Cuba, Portugal and Spain, of which the two first took 
place even in opposition to neighboring external influence, while 
the latter two happened at best with complementary support from out-
side functional units (national or international political parties, 
trade unions, church organisations etc. J. - On the other hand, 
in many cases where societal change has been induced by outside 
agents (mainly supported by one or the other of the "super-powers") 
it has in fact not led to more egalitarian structures but rather to 
the external imposition of a leading stratum as the link between 
the country and the external change agents in an effort to retain 
their influence. Such leading anti-egalitarian strata were externally 
established both in the capitalist and in the socialist sphere of 
influence. 
At the subnational level similar conditions apply. National liberation 
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movements have often gained their decisive momentum from peripheral 
subnational areas and have from there reformed the entire national 
societal system. On the other hand many "revolutions" initiated in 
the national capital have soon led to petrified national power 
structures which were extended over peripheral regions in the form 
o f n a t i o n a 1 l y a p p o i n t e d go v Pr ,7 er s ( e v e n i n f o r m a 1 l y d e m o c r a t i c 
federal systems like in various Latin American countries), of central 
planners or of centrally responsible administrators 
tive regions. 
for the respec-
It can therfore be assumed that in order to operate in a sustained 
way, societal change towards more egalitarian structures as well 
as towards broad economic, social and political development has 
to be supported to a major extent from within the respective local, 
regional or national social system. The fact that inward oriented, 
"cellular" (Paine 1976) or "segmentary" (Renfrew 1973b) societies 
can in fact have non-hierarchical, relatively egalitarian structures 
was shown, among others, by the forementioned authors for quite 
different time periods and geographic areas, as well as by earlier 
(precolonial) social patterns in the continents analyzed here, many 
of which are today called "underdeveloped". Examples are prE.,:i..capitalist 
agricultural (often tribal) societies in Asia (Haque et al.1977, p.16 
& 51), in Africa and in some parts of pre-colonial Latin American 
societies. 
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VI. Elements of a Strategy of Development "From Below" for Least 
Developed Regions in Third World Countries 
The available evidence quoted above indicates that traditional 
spatial development policies (predominantly of the centre-down-and-
outward type]in most cases have not - at least not within a sociallv 
and politically tolerable time span - been able to improve or 
even stabilize living levels in the least developed areas of 
Third World countries. Alternative spatial development strategies 
therefore need to be urgently considered. To solve problems of 
spatial disparities in living levels in Third World countries by 
increased urbanward migration from peripheral areas has meanwhile 
been widely discarded in view of the utter futility of trying 
to absorb these masses of migrants by urban labor markets and to 
supply them with basic urban infrastructure and services. 
As such an alternative, a development strategy "from below" is 
being discussed in this paper. It might be particularly adequate 
for the many areas which in the near future cannot expect to benefit 
from the traditional centre-down development strategies. 
At least for transitional periods during which the competetiveness 
with the world economic system is improved, it might therefore 
be particularly useful for subnational peripheral (predominantly rural) 
areas with the following characteristics [St6hr-Palme, 1977): 
(1) contiguous less developed [predominantly rural) areas with a 
relatively large population magnitude ~rovidir inter-
nal market for basic services and commodities; 
(2) low resource base per inhabitant (natural resources or human 
skills) for world wide demand; 
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(3) low living levels compared to other regions of the country 
and large distance from highly developed core regions; 
(4) few internal dynamic urban centers with ability to absorb large 
numbers of rural population in their labor market and infrastructure 
and service system; 
(5) areas with a sufficiently stro~ socio-cultural differentiation f ~ 
neighbouring areas to provide the basis for regional identity of 
its population. 
Development ''from below" needs to be closely related to the specific 
socio-cultural, historical and institutional conditions of the 
country and region concerned. Therefore no uniform patent recipe for 
such strategies can be offered as is often done for strategies 
of development "from above". However, the following elements would 
seem to be essential components of development strategies "from below'' 
al Provision of broad access to land as the key production factor of 
rural areas; in many pre-capitalist African, Asian, and Latin American 
societies this was originally the case and partly still is, but 
it has after colonization been superseded by European systems of 
often very differentiated private 0wnership of land. The retention 
or the introduction of fairly equal access to land (e.g. by land 
reform) as the key immobile production factor of most less developed 
areas seems an essential prerequisite to achieve broad effective 
demand for basic services and to create broad rural decision-making 
structures, both essential for development "from below". 
b) Revival of old or introduction of new socio-political and insti-
tutional structures for communal decision-making on the allocation 
of regiona resources (especially natural and human ones] at lower 
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and intermediate territorial scales. These territorially orgunized 
decision-making processes wuuld need to extend also to the regional 
allocation of the surplus generated from these resources and to the 
introduction of new techno is should they lead to the over-utili 
zation respectively under-utilization or idleness of regional 
resources. If regional resources become idle they should be used 
to improve local and regional infrastructure, possibly on a basis 
of collective self-help. The full and broad use of regional human 
and natural resources (with wide access to the latter) would further-
more contribute to a redistribution of income which increases 
broad effective demand for basic needs, including food. An increase 
in the productivity of agriculture by labor-intensive methods 
will be an important element for meeting this increased effective 
demand. 
c) Assignement of priority to projects which serve the satisfaction 
of basic needs of the population (food, shelter, basic services), 
using to a maximum possible regional resources and existing formal 
or informal societal structures of the respective region. Such 
priority - rather than the one given presently to export-base pro-
duction - would reduce the dependence from outside inputs and the 
backwash effects caused by them [deteriorating terms of trade, de-
pendence on world market fluctuations, dependence on external capital 
and technology and their price, introduction of external consumption 
patterns inadequate for the full utilization of regional resources, 
dependence on external decision-making, etc.). This includes the 
promotion of local and regional trade and service facilities for 
consumer goods and agricultural inputs and for regio~-based activities 
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such as food processing, animal breeding, power supply, repair of 
agricultural machinery etc., preferably by cooperative local or regio-
nal groups (Haque et al. 1977, p.64). 
d) Granting of a higher degree of self-determination to rural and 
other peripheral areas regarding the utilization or transformation 
of existing (or the creation of ne~ peripheral institutions to 
promote peripheral development in line with self-determined objec-
tives, instead of utilizing primarily external institutions to 
promote development by externally (mainly core-region) defined stan-
dards; this should lead to a greater balance in decision-making 
powers between peripheral and core-region population groups at 
all governmental levels; 
e) The introduction of national pricing policies reverting terms of 
trade more in favor of agricultural and other typically peripheral 
products; 
f) Restructuring of the urban and transport system to improve and 
equalize internal regional and national accessibility to urban func-
tions rather than mainly international accessibility. If both these 
systems are heavily externally oriented this may require a relocation 
of major urban functions (including national government] from 
peripheral (e.g. coastal) locations to the interior of the country. 
This should also apply to intermediate level functions and to the 
improvement of intra-regional accessibility within peripheral areas 
in order to improve their relative starting position. In case of 
comp et in g demand between s u c h f u n c t ion s at t he n at ion a l ,c_i r;d at s u b -
national levels, preference should be given to the improvement of 
intermediate urban functions in peripheral areas (e.g. peripheral 
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educational facilities oriented to specific regional development 
potentials) able to retain development impulses within the respective 
region rather than giving prio~i to natinndl Functi n n tional 
transport integration likely to drain development potentials into 
the core-regions. 
g) In case of insufficiency of peripheral resources for the satis 
faction of rural basic needs, external sr int rnational 
assistance should be provided, mainly considered as compensation for 
the eroding effects of previously emerged dependencies; such ex-
ternal assistance should be oriented mainly towards (1) the fuller 
productive utilization of peripheral human and natural resources, 
(2) the satisfaction of basic needs of the peripheral population, 
(3) the improvement of intra-peripheral transport and communications 
facilities, and (4) the formulation and implementation of locally 
initiated social and economic projects for the further processing 
of peripheral resources and the satisfaction of basic needs; the 
allocation of such external assistance should take place with majority 
participation of local and regional decision-making bodies; 
h) In the development of productive activities exceeding regional 
demand [so-called export base activities), priority should be given 
to activities facilitating: (ll the full employment of regional labor 
and natural resources; [2) the application of technology safeguar-
ding the full employment of regional resources; (3; competitiveness 
on extra-regional markets by qualitative differentiation of products, 
rather than by purely (quantitative) price competition in standar-
dized mass production. (4) particular promotion should be devoted 
I 
to small-scale labor intensive activities in rural areas building 
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on autochthonous technologies or developing them further as these 
usually permit the most efficient use of all locally available re-
sources, a maximization of output with available resources, the 
greatest adaptability to specific regional demand, as well as a 
broad distribution of income generated. (5) if competitiveness on 
) 
external markets seems to require the introduction of large-scale 
technology, the prior utilization of locally or regionally available 
intermediate technology and the improvement of local production 
conditions by local resource inputs (including communal self-help} 
should be attempted; 
i) Improvement of rural to-rural and rural-to-village transport 
and communications facilities (rather than the present priority 
given to rural to-large-urban communications) should be given pre-
ference in order to (1) increase commodity and service markets 
within peripheral areas permitting the realization of economies of 
scale and a better supply of all parts of the population with basic 
services, (2) increase the scale and diversity of factor markets 
within peripheral areas in order to reduce production costs, and 
thereby (3) facilitate increased processing, purchasing and marketing 
activities in peripheral areas sustained by peripheral groups, and a 
more decentralized national pattern of capital accumulation with 
greater participation of peripheral areas. 
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